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T
he experimental evaluation of an automatic procedure for sensor fault detection and
identi® cation in a real process under closed-loop control is the objective of the present
research. The scheme proposed here is very robust to faults in the main sensors of a
multiloop control system, thus improving safety and reliability of plant operations. A state
variable transformation is carried out in order to derive a model suitable for Recursive Least
Squares (RLS) identi® cation valid for all regimes of operation. The fault detection method
is based on a moving window statistical analysis of the estimated model parameters.
Simultaneously, a state estimation scheme, based on the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF),
enables the fault identi® cation, reduces false alarms and provides redundant measurements for
alternative control purposes. Experimental runs were carried out in an industrial-scale pilot
plant. Despite the large number of uncertainties and nonlinearities in the process, the system
exhibited a good performance when faults occurred in the sensors of the control loops.
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INTRODUCTION
The chemical process industries are characterized by a large
diversity and complexity of plants that often depend on
human operators, supported by some kind of automatic
control system. Such a strategy is strongly dependent on the
algorithms used to control the several sub-systems that
cause a loss of generality in relation to the global process. In
addition, there is a high degree of con® dence in the
information that ¯ ows through all kinds of instrumentation.
A failure in the measuring device of a control loop can
induce the controller to perform a set of undesirable and
inappropriate control actions.
In order to ensure the safety of the plant and to improve
the reliability of its operation, it is necessary to develop
mechanisms that, in the case of a failure in the instrumen-
tation, allow the detection and the identi® cation of the
fault, thus enhancing the robustness of the process control
structure.
One of the most common schemes used to achieve this
purpose is based on redundant systems which rely on
multiple sensors to measure the same process variable.
Another strategy with a great acceptance in industry is to
verify if the value of a particular variable lies between
acceptable limits, or to look at the highest variation
observed between two successive measurements. More
sophisticated techniques have, however, been proposed
which make use of knowledge-based systems1 and of
arti® cial neural networks2,3.
If a reasonably accurate model of the plant is available or
if it can be obtained by identi® cation then analytical
detection techniques can be employed4. Several surveys
concerned with different approaches to the problem of fault
detection using process models have appeared. Willsky5 is
the author of a classic paper discussing the most important
techniques available at the time and more recently
Isermann6, Patton7,8 and Frank9 have also focused on this
subject.
A great variety of fault detection schemes rely on residual
generation and testing, such as: the parity space
approach10,11, dedicated observer schemes and the innova-
tion-based approach7,12, as well as the parameter identi® ca-
tion approach6,13,14. These Fault Detection and Identi® cation
(FDI) strategies focused on examples from the chemical and
aerospace industries. However, most of the applications
described in the literature were mainly tested in a simulated
environment where many practical realities are totally
absent. Moreover, they did not attempt to go further in
what concerns the establishment of ef® cient control
policies, particularly when a fault occurs. This is particu-
larly important in the case where state and parameter
estimation techniques are used for fault detection and
identi® cation.
This paper deals with the experimental implementation of
an automatic scheme for fault detection and identi® cation in
an industrial-scale plant under multiloop SISO PI control.
The main goal is to evaluate the behaviour of the system
under feedback control when a failure occurs in any of the
sensors measuring the controlled variables. This task was
accomplished by making use of a dynamic model of the
process whose parameters are time varying and not well
known. Although the problem of multiple simultaneous
faults has already been addressed3 the present work is based
on the single-fault assumption.
490
0263±8762/98/$10.00+0.00
q Institution of Chemical Engineers
Trans IChemE, Vol 76, Part A, May 1998
The on-line identi® cation of the process model para-
meters was carried out by means of a variant of the basic
Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm. Since the
original model is non-linear, a new set of auxiliary variables
was de® ned in order to obtain a linear representation of the
process. This is particularly useful in processes where
variables suffer large variations, such as the case of batch
processing plants.
The fault detection step is achieved through a statistical
decision algorithm that analyses the behaviour of the
process parameters provided by RLS. Simultaneously, a
state estimation algorithm based on the Extended Kalman
Filter (EKF) enables the identi® cation of the fault by
comparing the estimated values of the variables with the
respective sensor measurements. Thus when a failure is
detected and identi® ed, the corresponding sensor is auto-
matically disabled and control of the related process
variable is carried out using an estimate supplied by EKF.
PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND MODELLING
The plant where the experimental tests were performed is
depicted in Figure 1 and is similar to that proposed by
Kershenbaum and Kittisupakorn15, for experimental testing
of control algorithms. A nonadiabatic stirred tank reactor
with a volume of 80 litres is fed by two liquid streams that
come from two pressurized tanks. Cold water ¯ ows from
tank 1 with ¯ owrate Q1 and temperature T1 and hot water
comes from tank 2 at temperature T2 and ¯ owrate Q2. These
¯ owrates are manipulated by control valves VC1 and VC2,
respectively.
The coolant ¯ owing through the jacket at temperature Tc
provides partial cooling of the reactor contents which is at
temperature T . The reactor out¯ ow is governed by gravity
and by control valve VC3 draining through a pipe into
atmospheric pressure.
The level in the reactor as well as in the feeding tanks is
measured by DP cells and all temperatures by Pt100 sensors.
A mass ¯ owmeter is employed to indicate ¯ owrate Q1 while
Q2 is measured by a mechanical volumetric ¯ owmeter. All
control valves VC1, VC2, VC3, and VC4 exhibit hysteresis
and are operated by proportional electrical actuators.
Both data acquisition and actuation are carried out by a
slave personal computer (equipped with 12-bit ADC/DAC
devices). The process is under the supervision of a UNIX
based workstation where the process status is graphically
monitored in real time by using standard computer graphic
techniques. More details can be seen elsewhere.16
Figure 2 shows the control loops and the corresponding
input and output variables. Feedback controllers C1, C2, and
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Figure 1. Simpli® ed ¯ owsheet of the pilot plant.
Figure 2. Pilot plant SISO multiloop control scheme.
C3, are discrete versions of conventional PI controllers with
a sampling period of 0.1min. C1 controls liquid level by
manipulating the outlet ¯ ow through control valve VC3.
Temperature inside the reactor is controlled with C2 that
drives valve VC1 to regulate the cold stream ¯ owrate Q1.
Finally, control valve VC4 is actuated by C3 in order to
ensure a constant stirring speed.
In the absence of chemical reaction, a simple model can
be derived based on total mass and energy balances.
Assuming constant density, the total mass in the tank is
given by:
dh
dt =
1
A
(Q1 + Q2 - Q3) (1)
where the outlet ¯ ow Q3 is a function of both reactor level
and VC3 position v3; this can be approximated by:
Q3 = b h + h0 a v31 + v3(a - 1) (2)
where a and b are adjustable parameters. The dynamic
behaviour of the reactor temperature can be obtained
through the correspondingenergy balance, assuming perfect
mixing and uniform jacket temperature:
dT
dt =
Q2
Ah
(T2 - T)+
Q1
Ah
(T1 - T)
+ Ug(A + p dr h)
Tc - T
q CpAh
(3)
Although the reactor is operated as a mixing tank, the
corresponding model exhibits some mild nonlinearities
associated with the state and input variables.
SENSOR FAULT DETECTION AND
IDENTIFICATION
The strategy presented here for fault detection and
identi® cation is schematically shown in Figures 3(a) and
(b), respectively. The fault detection method follows a
model based strategy, which includes the continuous
updating of the process model parameters. The main goal
is two-fold: ® rst, to enable an advanced warning mechanism
and second, to ensure good process representation for the
fault identi® cation and control stages. The warning
mechanism, is achieved by following the changes in the
estimated parameters and by presuming that unexpected
variations are an indication of some kind of failure in the
process. However, additional statistical analysis is required
in order to launch a fault detection alarm from an observed
change in the process parameters.
Figure 4 shows a schematic representation of the data
¯ ow through the instrumentation and control devices. The
process control under normal operation is represented in
Figure 4(a), and the strategy used in the case of a faulty
situation is indicated in Figure 4(b).
In the present paper, RLS is employed with constant
trace, as described by Shah and Cluett17, due to its relatively
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Figure 3. (a) Fault detection stage. (b) Fault identi® cation stage. Figure 4. Normal and faulty operation ¯ ow paths (schematic diagram).
fast convergence and numerical stability. It is a common
policy to linearize the model equations, although the
parameters would only be valid for small ¯ uctuations of
the process variables. Instead a different strategy has been
chosen by de® ning a set of auxiliary variables (that combine
two or more process variables) which make the system
model globally linear with constant parameters. Equations
(1) and (3) were discretized using a Euler ® rst order
approximation. After some reorganisation and de® ning the
new auxiliary variables, the following relations are
obtained:
y1,k+ 1 = p1y1,k + p2u1,k + p3u2,k + p4x1,k (4)
y2,k+ 1 = p5y2,k + p6x2,k + p7x3,k + p8x4,k + p9x5,k
+ p10x6,k + p11u3,k + p12x7,k (5)
with the model parameters de® ned as:
p,= 1
p2 = p3 = p4 = D tA
p5 = 1 - D tUg p drq CpA
p6 = -p7 = p8 = -p9 = D tA
p10 = D tUgq Cp
p11 = D tUg p drq CpA
p12 = -p10
and the following auxiliary variables:
y1,k = hk y2,k = Tk x5,k = Q1,kTkhk
u1,k = Q1,k x2,k = Q2,kT2,khk x6,k =
Tck
hk
u2,k = Q2,k x3,k = Q2,kTkhk u3,k = Tck
x1,k = Q3,k x4,k = Q1,kT1,khk x7,k =
Tk
hk
Based on the sequential parameter estimates provided by
the RLS scheme, one needs to continuously investigate if
there is any abnormality in the process operation. One
possible strategy which has been adopted here, consists in
carrying out conventional statistical tests over two moving
windows of the process parameter pro® les. A procedure
based on a combination of hypothesis tests is proposed here,
by which one expects to detect process failures. In this work,
a normal distribution is assumed for the parameter
estimates, and if there is a signi® cant change in their
statistical properties, particularly in their variances, then one
can presume that a failure has occurred in the process.
If sequential samples of sizes N1 and N2 are taken from
populations 1 and 2, respectively, then the statistical
hypothesis test for
H0 : r
2
1 = r 22 (no fault)
H1 : r
2
1 Þ r
2
2 (fault)
is the ratio of the two sample variances,
F0 = S
2
1
S22
H0 is rejected if F0 < F1- a / 2,N1-1,N2-1 or F0 > F a / 2,N1-1,N2-1,
where F0,max = Fa / 2,N1-1,N2-1 and F0,min = F1- a / 2,N1-1,N2-1
denote the upper ( a / 2) and the lower (1 - a / 2) percentage
points of the F distribution with N1 - 1 and N2 - 1 degrees
of freedom, respectively18.
In order to quantify the ef® ciency of this procedure, the
following de® nition is proposed
g = FDFV 1 -
FA
FA + FD
(6)
where FV represents the number of real faults which
occurred in the system and FA is the number of false alarms,
i.e., the number of times a non existent fault was accepted.
The number of real faults which were in fact detected is FD.
With this de® nition, both undetected faults and false alarms
are penalized and therefore, g will only have a value of 1
when all faults are detected (i.e. FD = FV ) and no false
alarms are produced (i.e., FA = 0).
The experimental tests revealed that this statistical
analysis was not reliable enough to perform the fault
identi® cation step. The intrinsic noise of the measurements
and the combination of variables used, unable the establish-
ment of fault `patterns’ , the so-called fault signature, often
applied in fault identi® cation9.
Alternatively, when a fault is detected, the estimated
values of the state variables, given by the EKF, are
compared to those supplied by the sensors. In this way, it
is possible to validate the fault detection alarm and mainly
to perform its identi® cation, providing that multiple failures
do not occur simultaneously. From the moment this
validation is done, the estimation of the process parameters
is suspended until the faulty sensor is replaced.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Despite the great interest in fault detection and identi® ca-
tion schemes, very few practical applications have been
reported in chemical industry plants under process control.
This is why control strategies are often rede® ned in order to
guarantee a safe plant operation. In the present work an
attempt is made to address this problem.
Table 1 shows the values for the physical parameters of
the process and the nominal operating conditions. Those
signed with (*) were estimated by using an orthogonal
distance regression for a set of 500 experimental points. The
PI controller parameters were tuned accordingly to the
AstroÈ m-HaÈ gglund method19 and are shown in Table 2 as
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Table 1. Physical data and operating conditions.
h0 = 3.9 dm Tc= 19 8 C
A = 17.6 dm2 T2 = 42 8 C
dr = 4.73 dm T1 = 19 8 C
q = 1Kg dm- 3 Q1 = 2 dm3 min-1
Cp = 4148JKg-1 K-1 Q2 = 11 dm3 min-1
D t = 0.1min h = 3 dm
a = 6.864* T = 298 C
b = 4.95* Ug = 962* J dm-2 min- 1 K- 1
Table 2. Controllers tuning parameters.
PI Set-point kc s i
C1 3 dm 5.5 80
C2 298 C 2.0 40
C3 120 rpm 0.4 20
well as the plant operation set-points. The initial values of
the parameter estimates used in the RLS are indicated in
Table 3.
The methodology described above has been fully
assessed by means of a large number of experimental
runs. In most cases, these last for several hours and all
included a starting-up period of 30 minutes. During this set-
up stage, the level control loop was under set-point and load
excitation to enable an adequate estimation of the model
parameters from the given initial values.
Based on all past experimental runs, the sample sizes N1
and N2 in the statistical decision test were investigated. It
was found that the range 81 # N # 121 minimizes false
alarms, leading to very high levels of detection ef® ciency, as
de® ned by equation (6). This is highlighted in Figure 5
where one can also see that for values of 91 # N # 111 all
process faults are detected and no false alarms are
generated. In all subsequent experimental runs a value of
N = 101 was used.
For the sake of simplicity only a test run is selected for
presentation here. Faults of different amplitudes and
durations were arti® cially imposed in the level and
temperature sensors. This is indicated in Table 4, where
faults are expressed in terms of percentage in relation to the
normal operating point. Information concerning the faulty
sensor and the respective duration period is also included.
Figure 6 shows the results obtained in the plant when this
set of faults was exerted in the level and temperature sensors
in the PI control loops,C1 and C2 respectively, for a 700min
long test. In Figures 6(a) and (b), h(Sensor) and T(Sensor)
represent the level and temperature as given by the
corresponding measuring devices. It is also indicated the
result of the EKF estimation, h(EKF) and T(EKF). The
curves h(Real) and T(Real) identify the real values of the
process variables, i.e., the real level and temperature in the
plant even when a sensor is disturbed. Figure 6(c) shows the
results of C1 and C2 control actions, respectively control
valve opening v3 and v1. Figures 7(a) and (b), illustrate the
behaviour of the remaining input variables: ¯ owratesQ1 and
Q2, control valve opening v2 and temperatures T1, T2, and
Tc.
The ® rst fault took place (see Figure 6(a)) in the level
sensor 75min after the beginning of the operation and
approximately 45min after the above mentioned start-up
period. Its effect can be directly observed by a rapid
response of C1 which quickly manipulates v3 to compensate
for this new situation, although in an undesirable fashion.
The onus for this wrong behaviour of the controller lies with
conventional feedback control schemes where the controller
is completely dependent on the sensor. Meanwhile, as it is
also apparent in Figure 8(a), the model parameter estimates
p2 and p3 of level equation (4) suffer a sudden change.
Although this might be meaningless by itself, with regards
to a fault occurrence, the detection mechanism warns that
the threshold limits for these parameters have been
exceeded in the statistical decision test. This is outlined in
Figures 9(a) and (b) where these limits of F0 are also
indicated by horizontal lines for a signi® cance level of
a = 2% and corresponding to an alarm situation. In the
present study, a value 5 times greater (F0 < 1 / 5F0,min and
F0 > 5F0,max) is assumed to indicate that an abnormal
variation in the process parameters has occurred and,
therefore, that a faulty situation exists in the system.
As soon as the fault is detected, the RLS estimation is
halted and the fault identi® cation stage is launched. This is
achieved by comparing the values given by the sensors to
those provided by EKF which is kept operating all the time.
It is worth mentioning that this step alone cannot be used for
detection because an occasional discrepancy between the
real measurement and the EKF estimate does not mean that
the process has suffered a `structural’ change. By comparing
h(Sensor) to h(EKF) and T(Sensor) to T(EKF), see Figure
6(a), it is easily concluded that the level sensor was the faulty
one. This sensor is immediately disabled and its measurement
signal, usually sent to the controller, is then replaced by the
corresponding EKF estimate. In few sampling times, the
controller is able to quickly recover from this upset thus
avoiding any further disruption of the system. In this case a
5min long fault shows the behaviour of the process plant.
The success of this strategy, and particularly the control
system performance, clearly relies upon the way the EKF is
used and upon the process model. With respect to the ® rst,
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Figure 5. Statistical fault detection ef® ciency.
Table 3. Initial parameter estimates.
p1 = 1 p7 = -p2
p2 = 5.68 ´10- 3 p8 = p2
p3 = p2 p9 = p2
p4 = -p2 p10 = 2.32´10- 2
p5 = 9.80 ´10- 1 p11 = 2.00´10- 2
p6 = p2 p12 = -p10
Table 4. Faults imposed in the process plant.
Sensor Amplitude Time intervals (min)
h -33% 75±80
T +25% 105±110
h +15% 145±165
T -20% 200±240
h +30% 270±300
T -30% 330±360
h -30% 390±420
h +40% 450±480
T -50% 530±560
T -50% 600±630
T +20% 660±690
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Figure 6. Evolution of process variables in the pilot plant where several faults were introduced in level and temperature sensors.
Figure 7. Additional process variable information described in Figure 6.
the procedure is the following: during the `normal’ period,
the EKF is made to believe both in the model and in the
observations, i.e., the values of model and measurement
noise covariance matrices,Q andR, are of the same order of
magnitude. As soon as a fault is detected, i.e., during the
`abnormal’ period, the diagonal element of matrix R,
corresponding to the faulty sensor, is made few orders of
magnitude higher. This is to force the state estimator to
disregard only that observation and, therefore, to increase its
con® dence in the corresponding model prediction. This is
also in accordance with the disablement of the faulty sensor
for all purposes until it is replaced or repaired. During this
period, the control system becomes quite dependent on the
model and, therefore, it is strongly recommended to have an
up to date and properly tuned process model. Since it is not
advisable to proceed with the RLS parameter estimation in
an abnormal situation the best set of parameters available up
to the time the fault was detected is used thereafter.
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Figure 8. Estimated process parameters with RLS. Parameters p2, p3 and p5, p9 are indicated in graphics (a) and (b) respectively.
Figure 9. Statistical test corresponding to the parameters depicted in Figure 8(a). Parameter p2 is indicated in graphic (a) and p3 is indicated in graphic (b).
A previously speci® ed set of subsequent faults, of
different amplitudes and durations, was applied to both
level and temperature sensors, as described in Table 4. The
results obtained in the pilot plant for faults in the
temperature sensor are depicted in Figure 6(b). Globally,
this means that, in a period of ® ve to six hours, eleven faults
were introduced into the system. The scheme presented here
was able to detect all of them in spite of a small drift in two
cases of the level control. This can be associated to the fact
that a low precision ¯ owmeter was used to measure
¯ owrate, Q2 of the main inlet stream (see Figure 7). In
addition to this, the actuator of control valve VC3 is not
suf® ciently sensitive to carry out small corrective actions
requested by the controller. Finally, the level measurement
is affected by intense noise which arises from the strong
agitation in the vessel. Due to problems in the water and
steam supplies, two unexpected events occurred: one
between 570 and 580min and the other between 665 and
680min. Both arose from dif® culties in the manual control
of level in feeding tank 2, which in turn, are the result of
strong oscillations in the pressure of the main water supply.
It is worth mentioning that both events disturbed level and
temperature in the reactor and that the second occurred
while a fault was present in the system. In the ® rst case, no
false alarm was generated although the reactor level
changed sharply.
Despite all of this, the performance of our FDI strategy is
quite remarkable particularly in what concerns its ef® ciency
(see equation (6)). Furthermore, the time required for
detection (usually from two to three sampling times) and the
ability to avoid drastic disturbances induced by the
controllers as a result of the erroneous information from
the sensors, demonstrates its capabilities for industrial
application.
Figure 8(b) shows the behaviour of the parameter
estimates of p5 and p9 relative to the energy balance,
equation (5), and their statistical analysis is represented in
Figure 10(a) and (b). For simplicity, only this small set is
represented because the pro® les of other process parameters
are analogous in similar situations. In fact some of them
exhibit different degrees of sensitivitywhen faults occurred,
but the most important issue is to stress the global effect on
process parameters changes.
CONCLUSIONS
Several experimental runs have been carried out in an
industrial scale pilot plant to test the scheme proposed for
process control with failures in the sensors of the control
loops. The results obtained are very promising considering
that the process plant can operate very satisfactorily for
periods longer than 30min in the event of large faults in
the sensors that drive the PI controllers. This is of much
importance in industrial systems because persistent erratic
data from faulty sensors can lead to wrong controller
actions and thus to serious and irreversible damage to the
process.
This FDI strategy can validate the information that ¯ ows
through the instrumentationand consequently improve plant
reliability. It is based on the process dynamics and therefore
requires a reasonably well tuned process model. However,
its simplicity, numerical robustness and the small computer
effort required, makes it amenable for small to medium
sized industrial applications.
Despite the good results obtained in the case of faults in
the sensors measuring the state variables used the main
control loops, additional work is under way in other areas.
That is the case of faults in the controller actuators and in the
sensors outside the control loops. Other problems deserving
further investigation are those concerned with the detection
and the identi® cation of slow varying faults, which are also
of much industrial importance.
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Figure 10. Statistical test corresponding to the parameters depicted in Figure 8(b). Parameter p5 is indicated in graphic (a) and p9 is indicated in graphic (b).
NOMENCLATURE
A cross-sectional area of the reactor
Ci PI controllers
Cp ¯ uid heat capacity
dr reactor diameter
h liquid level in the reactor
h0 level offset
pi linear model parameter
FD number of faults detected
FV number of process faults
FA number of false alarms
Q1 ,Q2 hot and cold water inlet ¯ owrates
Q3 reactor outlet ¯ owrate
T ¯ uid temperature in the reactor
Ti ¯ uid temperature in tank i
Tc coolant temperature
ui,k input process variable
Ug global heat transfer coef® cient
vi position of control valve VCi
xi,k linear auxiliary variable that combines process variables
Yi,k linear output process variable
Greek letters
a , b valve constants
D t sampling time
q ¯ uid density
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